1 JANUARY - 31 JANUARY 1945  

Preface                                                              Page
Narrative of Operations 1 Jan - 31 Jan 45                1
Operations Map                                                     2
Annex #1, G-l Report                                              3
Annex #2, G-2 Report                                             5
Annex #3, G-3 Report                                             6
Incl. "A" Signal Report                                     8
Annex #4, G-4 Report                                             9
Incl. "A", Engineer Report                                11
Incl. "B", Quartermaster Report                       14
Incl. "C", Chemical Report                               16
Incl  "D", Medical Report                                 17
This report is primarily concerned with the activities of the Western Visayan task
Force while the MINDORO ­ MARINDUQUE OPERATION was Under Eighth
Array control, from 1 January to 31 January 1945. A short summary of the initial
action (15 December - 31 December1 1944) under Sixth Army follows:

On 15 December 1944, the Western Visayan Task Force consisting of the 19th
Infantry RCT and the 503d Parachute RCT landed unopposed at SAN JOSE, the
principal seaport, located on the southwest coast of MINDORO. The town was
occupied that same day as work was started to place its two airdromes in
operating condition.

During the early phase of the operation strong defensive positions were
established alongthe perimeter and beach as enemy aerial attacks, aimed at our
resupply convoys and airfields, increased. Though work on the airstrips was not
seriously affected, suicide crash dives by enemy planes resulted in some serious
damage to our naval craft and some losses of cargo vessels.

On 27 December a Japanese Naval Task Force, reported enroute to CALAPAN
in north MINDORO, bombarded SAN JOSE while enemy planes increased their
attacks on our airdromes.  These naval units were driven off, however, after they
had been severely mauled by our aircraft.

By 1 January two dry weather runways on HILL and SAN JOSE Fields were
operational as plans for diversionary actions to the north were completed.


As of 1 January 1945, the date Eighth Army assumed control of the
MINDORO-MARINDUQUE OPERATION, activity along the east and west coasts
of MINDORO increased. (See Map on Page 2).

That same morning, Company "I" of the 21st Infantry made an unopposed landing
at BONGABONG on the east coast. On 2 January a rifle company of the 503d
made another unopposed strike at MAMBURAO near the northwestern tip and
pushed on to PALUAN which fell on the 5th after the extermination of the Jap

The most serious enemy resistance was encountered on the east coast in the
vicinity of PINAMALAYAN where on 6 January, an enemy force estimated to be
300-400 men hurled our assault troops back on QUINABIGAN. The setback was,
however, only temporary and PINAMALAYAN. was in our hands on the 11th. The
hostile garrison lost 37 men and retired northwest toward CALAPAN.

By the 30th of January no enemy forces capable of organized offensive or
defensive action remained in northwest MINDORO and mopping-up operations
were delegated to Filipino guerrillas.  Elements of the 21st Infantry except for a
small garrison at CALAPAN, the provincial capital, were evacuated to SAN JOSE.

Operations Instructions #80, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area had
read in part:
"...after establishing a beachhead on MINDORO, seize and occupy
MARINDUQUE ISLAND and other feasible objectives off the west coast of
BICOL to deceive the enemy."

Accordingly, on 3 January, Company "K" of the 21st Infantry landed near BUENA
VISTA on MARINDUQUE ISLAND. On 11 January MOGPOG was occupied as
the main Jap force, heavily entrenched at BOAC, was by-passed. Our forces, in
conjunction with local guerrillas, then surrounded and destroyed the enemy
garrison at BOAC.

In the latter part of January our forces began to assemble in the bivouac area
north of the BUGSANGA RIVER in the vicinity of SAN JOSE. By 1 February all
units except small garrisons left in CALAPAN and on MARINDUQUE were in the
bivouac area, and control of MINDORO passed to X Corps.

Our casualties during the entire period were 62 killed in action, 184 wounded in
action and 85 missing. Of these, 40 were killed and 41 wounded during the Eighth
Army phase of the operation. The missing were principally Air Corps personnel
lost during the period of greatest air activity.  Enemy casualties were 247 killed
and 38 captured. Of these, 228 were killed and captured during the Eighth Army

The major accomplishments in the MINDORO-MARINDUQUE operation were as
1. Strategic air fields were established which enabled our air forces to
adequately support the LUZON operations.
2. The Japanese wore deceived as to our actual intentions in south LUZON by
our diversionary actions.                                                                          page1
Organization of G-1 Section - G-1 section was organized into four sub-sections
and functioned as outlined below:
Personnel sub-section handled routine administrative matters and coordinated
the activities of the other three subsections.

Operations sub-section issued instructions to the Western Visayan Task
Force in Administrative Order 2 to continue sending this headquarters the same
information concerning personnel matters formerly submitted to Sixth Army.

       No replacements were furnished units of the Western Visayan Task Force
during the period 1 January through 31 January 1945.

       Weekly periodic reports were submitted to this headquarters by the Western
Visayan Task Force from 2 January- to 30 January 1945.

Miscellaneous sub-section processed tho following awards and decorations to
personnel in the Western Visayan Task Force:
        Legion of Merit                        1
        Silver Star                               3
        Bronze Star Medal                   126
        Meritorious Service Unit Plaque 7

        Recommendations for the following awards are still awaiting action by

        Legion of Merit                        3 (one to a Naval Officer)
        Bronze Star Medal                   2 (to guerrilla officers)

Civil Affairs Section - Philippine Civil Affairs Unit No. 9 was attached to the
Western Viseyan Task Force for the control of civil affairs on MINDORO. During
tho period of Eighth Army control in this area the unit administered relief
to civilians, aided in the opening of schools, prevented government equipment and
supplies from falling into unauthorized hands and assisted civil authorities in
enforcing law and order.

       Combat units required a large supply of laborers but only a limited number
were available in San Jose. By registering all available laborers and through
cooperation with local officials, PCAU No. 9 procured a maxiinum of workers.

       In cooperation with the Army Medical Units the PCAU Medical Officer
instituted a program to decrease the high malaria rate (highest in. the Philippines)
by insuring that all civilians took atabrine.

Dissolution of Task Force - The Western Visayan Task Force was dissolved
as of 0001 I, 1 February and headquarters personnel returned to the organizations
to which they were assigned.

Summary of Lessons Learned

     a. Proper cooperation between Commanding Officers and civilian authorities
will result in a minimum of government property falling into the hands of
unauthorized civilians.

     b. Similar cooperation can also effect the procurement of a maximum number
of laborers at minimum wages.

     c. Philippine Civil Affairs Units can render invaluable aid to a military operation
of this nature by relieving troops of all civilian problems.
                                                                                                      page 4

  1. The period of Eighth Army control over the MINDORO-MARINDUQUE area
extended from 1 January 1945 to 31 January 1945. Before this period opened, the
landings on MINDORO had been successfully consolidated. The landings on
MARINDUQUE occurred on 3 January, and planning and preparations for this
operation had been completed before Eighth Army assumed control.
For this reason the principal function of G-2 Eighth Army with respect to
MINDORO--MARJNDUQUE consisted of compiling reports on operations in the
area for the information of higher headquarters and other interested units, and
disseminating pertinent intelligence to the Western Visayan Task Force. A number
of requests made by the task force were acted upon in the manner described
in succeeding paragraphs.

  2. The Western Visayan Task Force requested maps, photos, terrain studies
and meteorological data on BUSUANGA ISLAND and the Calamian Group. In reply
to this request, G-2 Eighth Army forwarded a few copies of available photos on
BUSUANGA ISLAND and CUYO ISLAND. The task force did not request a special
mission.  There were no terrain studies covering the area. Available information
concerning water supply, weather, and tides was forwarded by the Engineer
Section. A small number of all available maps of the specified areas was sent to
the task force, and it was suggested that the sheets desired in bulk be specified.
No request along these lines was received, and no further action was taken.

3. The Psychological Warfare Branch was involved in considerable activity in
connection with this operation. On 15 January 1945 the G-2, Western Visayan
Task Force, requested a Psychological Warfare Representative. W. 0. 1 Barry
Robinson, Australian Imperial Forces, on duty with G-2 Eighth Army, was at once
dispatched and leaflets were furnished. Leaflets were dropped on MARINDUQUE
ISLAND in connection with the landing there. A "spot" leaflet was also prepared for
use on LUBANG ISLAND, but was not used because it was decided to make no
attack on LUBANG during the period under consideration.                          page 5

   1. Tactically, this operation was unique for the following reasons. Although it was
an amphibious assault atld there was a possibility of the enemy making a defensive
stand in the SAN JOSE area, the chief threat to the WVTF was a possible over
water movement by Jap forces to drive us out of MINDORO therefore plans for
defensive as well as offensive operations were required and a defensive field order
was issued prior to embarkation.

The same boundaries between regiments were used for the defensive plan as for
the assault plan. These were based on three probable lines of enemy action which
are listed in order of importance as follows:

       a. An amphibious landing on the same beaches used by our forces.

       b. A landing to the northwest in the vicinity of the LUMINTAO River, with an
overland envelopment against the SAN JOSE area.

       c. A landing southeast of our position with an ensuing overland assault on the
SAN JOSE area.

      The defense plan was divided into two phases. Phase I covered a period of
approximately one week's duration prior to the installation of heavy obstacles and
splinter-proof gun positions. The OPLR was at the beachline -while the MLR
paralleled the beach at 1000 yards. As time and materials became available, the
MLR was developed along the beach with heavy barbed wire
entanglements and interlocking FPLs (Phase II).

      Adequate protection of the airfield sites necessitated the defense of large
ground areas. This was accomplished by maximum use of automatic weapons and
obstacles at the beach, constant observation along the perimeter and the holding
out of strong mobile reserves. Use of the narrow-guage railway for movement of
local reserves was included in the plan due to limited road facilities.

   2. Defense of the airfields presented the problem of efficient employment of air
corps troops. The air corps requested that the infantry be held responsible for the
close-in defense of airplanes as well as the defense of the airfields. Due to
the insufficiency' of infantry troops to perform this mission, it was planned during an
emergency, to assemble all available air corps personnel under command of the
local infantry commander.

   3. Considering the complexity of the task force mission which involved the
construction of airfields, naval facilities, the use of MINDORO as a base for
resupply of other operations, coupled with the constant influx of new units; this was
an ideal mission for a division reinforced.

       The task force however, had to function with an inexperienced staff whose
members were unacquainted with each other and which was 50% understrength.    
                                                                                     page 6
       Coordination between a regular infantry RCT and a parachute infantry RCT
created problems that would not ordinarily arise within the units organic to the

   4. The team work, cooperation and flexibility of operation demonstrated by units
of the PT squadron, the air corps and the ground forces in meeting the Japanese
naval task force threat (two cruisers and six destroyer's) on the night of 26/27
December was superb.  

       The enemy task force was reported about 30 miles northwest of SAN JOSE
at 1300 I, 26 December. Our air forces and PTs immediately went into action,
inflicting tremendous damage. Planes strafed and bombed the Jap warships, they
then returned, refueled, reloaded and repeated the process
until long after dark, using landing lights to carry out their mission.

       As a result of this determined action, one destroyer was sunk, two possibly
sunk and the remainder so severely damaged as to make their naval
bombardment, highly ineffective when they finally arrived about 6 miles offshore
from our positions.

   5. Lessons learned:

       a. In future operations the use of elements of ground crews for close-in
defense of planes should be air corps standard operating procedure.

       b. The assignment of unloading details of 100 men for each LST not mobile
loaded, should be standard procedure.  In this operation this proved to be
eminently sound both tactically and logistically.

       c. In an operation where considerable enemy air activity is expected the
antiaircraft units of fire should be increased. In this instance six units of fire were
requested but were not supplied.                                                              page 7


   In this operation the Eighth Army Signal Officer was directed to continue the
installation operation and maintenance of communication facilities in the MINDORO
area effective 1January 1945. The facilities referred to were previously established
and operated by the WVTF under control of Sixth Army.

   Preparations for the continuation of the mission were discussed at a GHQ
conference on 18 November 1944, which covered communication problems
involved in the original landing and occupation of the island.

   The establishment of radio frequencies to be used on circuits between Eighth
Army and WVTF was included in Item 30-3, SOI, Headquarters Eighth Army, dated
20 December 1944, and Item 31-3, SOI, Headquarters Eighth Army, dated 20
December 1944.  Fixed call signs and radio telephone code words were assigned
in Item 33-3, 301, Headquarters Eighth Army, dated 20 December 1944.  The
telephone code name for WVTF was assigned in Item 40-2, SOI, Headquarters
Eighth Army, 20 December 1944.

   Distribution of codes and ciphers was made in the usual manner. Upon request
by the WVTF, SIGKIJI rotors and SIGIVI baskets were furnished in order to
facilitate operation.

   On 1 January 1945, the operation of Air Safehand Courier Service was taken
over, using our planes and personnel. Schedules were arranged to coordinate the
MINDORO run with other courier runs throughout the Southwest Pacific Area

   All enemy intercepts were handled by the W T F directly with GHQ with the
exception of one radio relayed by this headquarters to GHQ for disposition.

   Signal Supply activities consisted of the follow-up and forwarding to MINDORO
of miscellaneous unshipped items.

   Inspection of the 193d Signal Radar Maintenance Unit, lype A, revealed that this
unit had been unable to perform its mission since arrival as all equipment, except
two trucks, had been sunk on an LST enroute. The commanding officer of this unit
was on detached service throughout the operation. This headquarters
arranged the assignment of a new commanding officer. As replacement of
equipment had not been made, however, maintenance responsibilities were
assumed by the 203d Radar Maintenance Unit.

   Maintenance work performed by the 203d Radar Maintenance Unit, Type C, for
the 166th AAA Gun Battalion was excellent.  

   Signal units comprising communication troops for WVTF, namely, 1st Platoon,
Company A, 98th Signal Battalion and the 24th Radio Station Section, were cited
for zealous devotion to duty while under severe shelling, bombing and ack-ack fire
from enemy naval vessels. These units continued their excellent performance during
the period covered by this report.

   On 31 January 1945 the responsibility for communications on MINDORO was
taken over by the 24th Infantry Division.                                             page 8



   From 15 December 1944 through 31 December 1944 the Commanding General,
Sixth Army was responsible for the logistical support of the
MINDORO-MARINDUQUE operation. On 1 January 1945 the logistical support and
control of the operation was delegated to the Commanding General, Eighth Army.

   The operation was to be resupplied from Base "K", LEYTE. Blockloaded San
Francisco Port of Embarkation ships were to be furnished according to a
predetermined schedule which was based on an eight-day turn around.

   The Commanding General, Western Visayan Task Force, operated an Army
Supply Point at SAN JOSE, MINDORO.

   The status of supply as of 1800, 31 December was as follows:

   Ration Strength:  28,000
   Rations on hand: 10 D/S. 6 D/S reported on hand by Western Visayan                
                              Task Force, estimated 4 D/S additional arrived on LST's          
                              on U / 15.
    V-80 gasoline:    9 D/S. 4 D/S reported on hand by Western Visayan Task         
                              Force, estimated 5 D/S additional arrived on LST's on
                             U / 15.
   Diesel fuel :         Nil D/S reported on hand, estimated 2 D/S arrived on               
                              LST's on U / 15.
   100 Octane gas: 6700 drums, nil bulk.
   Bombs:              15 D/S (information from 5th AF).


   Supply levels were to be maintained in the MINDORO AREA as follows:

   Class I to IV                           30 D/S

   Class V         Combat units       3 U/F
                       Service units        2 U/F

   Subsequent to 7 January 1945, scheduled resupply convoys were to be run in
conjunction with those for the Mike-I area.  Standard blockloaded ships were to be
called forward as required to arrive at the MINDORO AREA not later than
indicated below:
                       5 January 1945    1 ship
                       22 January 1945  1 ship
                       28 January 1945  1 ship
                       9 February 1945  1 ship                                            page 9

   When this operati n was taken over, the force on MINDORO was engaged in
minor operations on the nearby islands and in mopping up enemy forces on
MINDORO. Only routine supply problems were involved in the continuation of the

   Two of the three airstrips had been completed and the third was completed
during this period. The supply dumps were moved inland from the beach area to
the vicinity of SAN JOSE. The dumps were well dispersed and efficiently
operated. A two-lane road was built for hauling supplies from the beach to the
dumps and one way roads were constructed throughout the dump areas. These
roads were arranged in such a way that very little cross traffic and delay was

   About 8 of the 50 miles of narrow gauge railroad on the island was put into
operation and served to carry supplies from the beach to the dump area.
Roadbeds were improved and tracks extended so that all dumps could be
serviced. This aided greatly in moving supplies from beach to dump and
materially reduced track traffic on the roads.

   The facilities of the Army Supply Point were developed so that the Mike-VI
operation could be resupplied from, MINDORO. The mission of resupply included
arranging air drops, flying emergency supplies to the Mike-VI area and
establishing credit and facilities for air evacuation of casualties.

   The operation of the supply point was delegated to the Commanding General,
24th Infantry Division on 31 January 1945 when Headquarters Western Visayan
Task Force was dissolved.                                                      Page 10



  Effective OOO1, 1 January 1945, Sixth Army was relieved of its mission on
MINDORO ISLAND and Eighth Army was assigned the mission of completing the
operation. At this time the following engineer units were involved in the operation:

Unit                                               Commander

Western Visayan Task Force                         Lt. Col. William Ellison, Jr.
                                                          (Task Force Engineer)
532d Engr Boat & Shore Regt (-
Co A & Co C less 1 P1)                                 Col. A. M. Neilson
3d Airfield Cons Squadron (RAAF)                 Squadron Leader A. D. Bouch
240th Engr Construction Bn                           Lt. Col. Walter S. Schamel, Jr.
860th Engr Aviation Bn                                  Lt. Col. Benjamin E. Meadows
866th Engr Aviation Bn                                  Lt. Col. John H. Hamilton
187th Engr Aviation Bn                                  Lt. Col. Robert W. Love
Co B, 3d Engr Combat Bn                             Capt. Louis P. Zupet
Co C, 161st Engr Parachute Bn                     Capt. James S. Bayer
1458th Engr Maint Co (-1st & 2d Pls)             1st Lt. E. W. Sparks
2d PI, 453d Engr Depot Co                           1st Lt. Leon Skolnick
Det, 783rd Engr Pet Dist Co                          1st Lt. Cecil Young
Det, 1541st Engr Base Survey Co                  2d Lt. Dean E. Hodges

   At approximately 0645 1 January 1945 a detachment of Hq & Hq Company,
932d Engineer Construction Group (Avn) commanded by Lt. Col. Stephen M
Smith arrived at Hill Field. Upon arrival Lt. Col. Smith became the assistant task
force engineer.

  No other major changes in units and personnel were made during the period 1
January to 31 January 1945.


  All engineer planning for this operation had been accomplished by Sixth Army
prior to the start of the operation.  Additional engineer planning by this
headquarters was not necessary.


   On 1 January two dry weather runways on MINDORO were operational, Hill
Field and San Jose Field. On 5 January a short heavy rainfall made both of these
runways non-operational.  The San Jose runway which had been crowned was
back into operation about 36 hours before the Hill Field runway. Taxiway A on Hill
Field was used as a temporary runway about 12 hours before the
runway itself was back in operation. This rain had no adverse effect on the flow
of supplies. Both Blue and White beach were connected to the unit bivouac areas
by all weather gravel roads which remained in excellent condition. On 12 and 13
January continuous rains again made the dry weather fields non-operational
                                                                                                  page 11
for a period of approximately sixty (60) hours. On 24 January the avgas jetty was
utilized to pump avgas directly into storage from a medium sized tanker and on
the same day a water line was completed making it possible to furnish fresh
water to the tanker.

    During the period 1 January to 7 January 1945, construction progress was
delayed because of heavy shipping losses and continuous nightly attacks by
Japanese aircraft. The aircraft attacks after 7 January were negligible but the
shipping losses began to make themselves felt. During the remainder of the
month the construction progress was hampered by the following shortages:
floating pile driver, motor fuel, tires for dump trucks, lumber, bitumen, bulk
storage tanks, and four inch invasion pipe fittings. These shortages resulted in the
completion of the first all-weather runway {Camina Drome) ten (10) days later
than originally planned. In addition the construction of an adequate drum cleaning
and filling plant had to be delayed until sufficient storage tanks were available.


    Initial supply of engineer materials for the Mindoro operation was provided by
Sixth Army. Just prior to assumption of responsibility by Eighth Army, enemy
suicide bombings disabled the vessel JUAN DE FUCA and drove it on a reef. This
vessel carried bitumen, timber, and miscellaneous engineer supplies, as well as
avgas installation materials which had been trans-loaded from two FS boats. Part
of this cargo was salvaged.  A month later, but construction of avgas installation,
fuel jetty, and the first all-weather drome was delayed to some extent until
replacement materials arrived. Delay in arrival and incomplete cargoes of ships
from New Guinea carrying landing mat and avgas tankage further complicated the
supply prdblem, but critical supplies were furnished by diversion of the vessel
ELIJAH WHITE carrying heavy equipment, piling, cement, culvert and nails, and
by emergency loading of LST's and the vessel C00LEY at Leyte with bitumen;
arid portable huts.

   The most difficult problem encountered in supply of the Mindoro operation was
the arrival of ships in the objective area.  The vessel ELIJAH WHITE arrived at
the M-6 area by mistake; the vessel COOLEY was left sitting at Leyte while two
convoys it was scheduled to join sailed away. Eventually these vessels arrived in
the Mindoro area.


   The Eighth Army Engineer received notification from the Sixth Army Engineer
on 31 December 1944 that bulk map stocks for the Mindoro operation were
ready for turnover. At that time the Eighth Army had no personnel or facilities
available for the proper haridling, storage, and distribution of maps. Twelve (12)
men from the 11th Airborne Division were immediately obtained on a temporary
duty status and organization of the Eighth Army Provisional Map Depot was
accomplished by 2 January 1945. This newly formed unit handled 100,000 maps
during the operation.                                                                   page 12
    The mapping mission of Eighth Army, to resupply maps on call to the
Commanding General, Western Visayan Task force, was accomplished


    A floating pile driver should be available in the objective area early enough in
tho operation to allow for the completion of jetties and docks by the target dates
set up. The Australian Engineer unit (3d Airfield Construction
Squadron, RAAF) attached to the task force performed all its tasks in an
excellent manner. The capabilities of this unit were on a par with those of the
average United States Construction
Battalions.                                                                                            page13
Inclosure "B" to Annex #4


    The MINDORO - MARINDUQUE operation was initially under the direction of
Sixth Army. The Quartermaster plan published as Annex 1 to Sixth Amy
Administrative Order 15, dated 23 November 1944, prescribed among the other
things that after U plus 22 a thirty (30) day level of Classes I, II, III and IV
supplies would be maintained.

    Effective 1 January 1945, quartermaster units gained were as follows:

                        301st QM Rhd Co (-1 Plat)
                        389th QM Trk Co (-3d Plat)
                        1st Plat 3818 QM Gas vp Co
                        4th Plat 360th QM Bkry Co
                        1st Sec 101st QM GR Plat
                        193d QM Ldry Plat (2d Field Hosp)

    Total strength of troops at MINDORO at that time was 25,802.

    On 4 January 1945 tuis section recommended to G-4 and Chief of Staff that
the following additional quartermaster units be moved to MINDORO to provide
quartermaster service on a projected strength of 54,000 to 60,000:

                        1 QM Serv Co
                        1 QM Rhd Plat
                        3 QM Refer Sections
                        1 QM Bkry Co
                        1 QM Ldry Plat

    Since there were no units of the above type available to Eighth Army for
movement to MINDORO a letter was drafted for dispatch to GHQ requesting the
additional units. Additional truck units were not requested in view of the early
arrival of the 24th Division Quartermaster Company and six (6) quartermaster
aviation truck companies at MINDORO or enroute. However, the request to GHQ
was not approved by the Chief of Staff, this headquarters, on the basis that
previous requests for additional units for MINDORO had been disapproved by

    It was realized that the most critical need was an additional bakery unit. This
section recommended on 16 January 1945 the movement of Headquarters and
1st Platoon, 123d QM Bakery Company from LEYTE to MINDORO upon
release from its present duties on or about 25 January.  This was approved and
the unit was scheduled for shipment to MINDORO on 8 February 1945.

    Automatic resupply of the operation was originally set up to be maintained
through U / 70, but was changed                                        page 14
to remain in effect through 1 April 1945. On 11 January 1945 this section
requested four resupply ships stocked with Class I, Class II and IV, Class III and
PX supplies for thirty tnousand (30,000) men for twenty (20) days.  V-80 gasoline
and diesel fuel supplies included in Class III were limited to 102,500 gallons each.
    These ships were to arrive as follows:

                                One ship on 16 Jan.
                                One ship on 22 Jan.
                                One ship on 3 Feb.
                                One ship on 13 Feb.

    A critical cigarette shortage developed when the resupply ship, Allen Johnson,
arrived without its quota of cigarettes aboard. Request was made on Base "K"
for 1200 cases by the Western Visayan Task Force Cormander and a
four day supply was dispatched on FS Boat 160. With the arrival of the second
resupply ship, the Russell Chittenden without cigarettes aboard, the situation
became more critical.

    Base "K" advised the commander of the WVTF by radio to establish air
priority for 1200 cases of cigarettes, which had been made available at Base
"G". This was requested but the Regulating Officer, LEYTE did not concur.
Arrangements were made by the WVTF with the 5th Air Force to send planes to
Base "0" for 1200 cases but as of 1February this matter was still pending.

    On 9 January the quantity of V-80 gasoline became critically short and
resupply vas flown into the objective area by C-47's.

    In accordance with Eighth Army Administrative Order #4 dated 15 January,
the Commanding General, WVTF was charged with the responsibility for
receiving and storing supplies for resupply of units in the Mike-six operation.

    Major Carroll HcHcnry of this section returned on 17 January from an
inspection trip to MINDORO. His report did not reveal any serious difficulties and
all quartermaster units were found to be operating in a most satisfactory manner.

    On 2 February 1945 the following quartermaster units were awarded the
Service unit plaque for superior performance and devotion to duty from 20
November 1944 to 20 January 1945 by the Commanding General, Eighth Army.

                        1st Plat, 3613 QM Gas Supply Co
                        301st QM Rhd Co
                        4th Plat, 360th QM Bkry Co

    The Western Visayan Task Force was dissolved on 31 January and the
Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division assumed control of MINDORO on 1
February 1945.
                                                                                                page 15
Inclosure "C" to Annex #4


    Though a state of non-gas warfare existed throughout this operation, the
usefulness of a small detachment of chemical service troops was clearly

    A detachment of fifteen enlisted men under the command of one officer from
the 272d Chemical Service Platoon furnished the chemical troops for the task
force. One enlisted flamethrower mechanic was attached to each of the
two regiments, and twelve enlisted men were used as general chemical service
troops. The function of the service troops was to collect, repair, and maintain the
chemical warfare equipment of the task force.

    The only offensive chemical weapons taken on this operation were the
portable flamethrowers. Opportunity for their use however, was limited.

    Throughout the action, shipping in the harbor was exposed to enemy air
attacks which became quite serious.  Plans were developed for a smoke screen
to be laid over the harbor using floating smoke pots. The plan was tested and
proved quite successful, A chemical mortar company was requested to help put
up defensive screens over shipping, but due to the lack of such troops, the
request was not granted.

    The gas masks of all the ground force troops were inspected by the chemical
detachment, and it was found that about 4500 masks needed replacement or
repairs.  These repairs, in addition to the jobs of operating a
central flamethrower repair shop and establishing a sizable chemical dump, kept
the detachment quite busy.

    No evidence was found on this operation which would indicate that the
Japanese intended to use gas. A gas alert was called on one occasion, but upon
investigation it proved to be a false alarm.

    The Task Force Chemical Officer and his detachment did a commendable job
in planning and executing the harbor smoke screen and in the accomplishment of
their repair, maintenance and other missions.

    It is recommended in future operations that a detachment of chemical troops
be attached to the task force in the following ratio - 1 platoon per division and
proportionate parts of a platoon for smaller forces.                         page 16



    The following non-divisional medical units were located in this area:

                412th Medical Collecting Company, Separate
                2d Field Hospital, Semi-mobile (w/atch ldry plat)
                13th Station Hospital (250 bed)
                1st Platoon, 605th Medical Clearing Company
                39th Malaria Survey Unit
                8th Malaria Control Unit
                55th Malaria Control Unit
                10th Portable Surgical Hospital

    All of the medical units functioned in the vicinity of SAN JOSE MNDORO, and
performed the following missions.

                1. The 412th Medical Collecting Company engaged in performing
routine ambulance support for the 24th Division.

                2. The 2d Field Hospital (w/atchd ldry plat) and the 13th Station
Hospital (250 bed) were established under tentage with a minimum of
prefabricated huts.  They operated at about 70% capacity. Unit nurses arrived on
22 January.

                3. The 1st Platoon, 605th Medical Clearing Company, Separate,
established a holding station at the airstrip for air evacuation of casualties and
operated a clearing station one-half mile south of Hill Airdrome.

                4. The 38th Malaria Survey had practically completed its survey of the
objective area by 1 January.  This survey was directed toward insect sectors.

                5. The 8th and 55th Malaria Control Units engaged in fly, mosquito
and insect control in the survey area. Special emphasis was placed on mites.

                6. The 10th Portable Surgical Hospital assisted one of the 24th
Division's medical collecting companies in the treatment of surgical casualties in
an advanced area north of SAN JOSE.

                7. The 9th Medical Supply Platoon, Aviation, arrived at MlNDORO on
30 January and established a depot in the vicinity of the 13th Station Hospital.

                8. The above units furnished medical service to guerrillas and civilians
wherever necessary and when the military situation permitted.


    A 30 days level for all classes of supply was maintained at MINDORO. This
included medical supplies earmarked for operations in southern LUZON. All
supplies were received, stored and issued by the Division
                                                                                                 page 17
Medical Officer, 24th Division, whole blood was shipped by air on request from
the Task Force Surgeon. Reports by inspectors indicated no shortage of critical


    Hospitalization for the troops in the MINDORO area was adequate. However,
the total number of beds occupied during January does not reflect the actual
number of casualties. Actually there was a minimum of casualties
in the MINDORO operation. The additional beds occupied were by patients
evacuated from LUZON.

    Toward the latter part of January the strength of the garrison was greatly
augmented by the arrival of air personnel reinforcements. To meet this increase in
hospitalization requirements it was deemed necessary to move the 165th Station
Hospital (50 bed) from LEYTE to MINDORO. This unit arrived on 8 February
following X Corp's assumption of control.

    All hospital sites were located on firm ground and were convenient to the
troops. The areas were level and covered with "Cogon" grass (similar to Kunai
grass).  Areas were promptly cleared of this grass. Ample drainage was
provided and the water supply, provided by engineer units, was adequate. Within
the hospital areas water was piped to messes, surgery, X-ray, laboratory and to
patient's, officer's and detachment's showers.  Floored tents with screens
provided adequate quarters for nurses. Privacy was afforded by burlap partitions.


    Prior to Eighth Army control evacuation had been principally by naval assault
shipping, As air facilities developed, however, air became the chief means of
evacuation.  There was no death attributable to air or water transportation. Only
those casualties which required more definitive treatment or prolonged
hospitalization were evacuated. Practically ail the evacuation was to LEYTE
where the patients were admitted to USAS0S hospitals. The treatment of
patients both in MINDORO and after evacuation was observed by members of
the professional section of this office and was deemed excellent.


    Epidemic diseases of importance encountered in the MINDORO operation
were Infectious Hepatitis and Scrub Typhus. Outbreaks of both diseases were
investigated and control measures instituted.
                                                                                                 page 18
    1. Infectious Hepatitis; From 15 December 1944 to 28 January 1945 three
hundred and nineteen (319) cases of this disease were admited to MINDORO
hospitals. Fifty-five (55) separate organizations were affected, thirty-
six (36) of which were ground force units, the remainder air force. The
epidemological evidence indicates that in the majority of units the infection was
acquired on LEYTE. Importance of sanitation and a rat-extermination program
were stressed as control measures.

    2. Scrub Typhus; From 15 December 1944 to 20 February 1945 seventy-one
(71) cases of this disease were hospitalized on MINDORO. The peak of the
outbreak was reached early in January, two or three weeks after the
initial landing. None of the units affected was equipped with impregnated clothing.
The areas of exposure were localized and contact with "Cogon" grass was
established in all cases. Examination of "cane" rats in the area revealed
numerous mites and some ticks on the ears of all rats examined.  Extensive
clearing and burning of bivouac areas beginning in January brought the outbreak
under control.  An emergency supply of bulk di-mothyl phthalate was dispatched
by air to MINDORO as soon as the first cases of Scrub Typhus were recognized.
This headquarters issued a directive on typhus control and provided material for
impregnation. Some units were slow in carrying out this preventive measure even
after the material was provided.  This deficiency was brought to the attention of
Task Force Headquarters and was immediately corrected.

    3. Schistosomiasis: Previously unrecognized cases of this disease were
discovered by the Army Medical Inspector in MINDORO hospitals. Forty-four
(44) cases were subsequently recognized and reported. All were clearly related
to the endemic areas on LEYTE where personnel and units had been previously


    Hospitalization and evacuation were ample for the forces employed. As the
amount of troops increased hospital facilities were proportionately augmented.

    Evacuation was principally by air and the results obtained were excellent.


    It is recommended that unit nurses should join units as soon as practicable. In
this particular operation enemy opposition did not preclude the possibility of
bringing nurses in earlier. This would have greatly facilitated
the care of the sick and wounded.

    It is also recommended that a more thorough medical survey of the objective
area be made, which will result in a decrease in the number of non-battle
casualties due to disease.
                                                                                                 page 19

The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.                        1
(thru channels)(with supporting documents)
CincAFPAC                                                                  1
Comdr ANF                                                                  1
Comdr AAF                                                                  1
Comdr Third Fleet                                                         1
CG USAFFE                                                                 1
CG USASOS                                                                1
CG Sixth Army                                                              1
CG FEAF                                                                     1
CG Fifth Air Force                                                         1
CG Thirteenth Air Force                                                 1
CG Fifth Fighter Command                                            1
CTF 76                                                                         1
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Comdr Attack Group 78.3                                              1                
CO 503d Pcht Regt                                                       1
CG Eighth Army                                                            1
CG Third Amphibious Force                                           1
CO 308 Bomb Wing                                                       1
CO 310 Bomb Wing                                                       1
CG 24th Inf Div                                                              1
CG WVTF (Gen Dunckel)                                               1
CO 19th Inf                                                                   1
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Command ant, ANSCOCL                                              1
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Commandant, Naval War College                                   1